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Abstract
Background: Understanding transmission dynamics of the pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus in various exposure
settings and determining whether transmissibility differed from seasonal influenza viruses was a priority for decision
making on mitigation strategies at the beginning of the pandemic. The objective of this study was to estimate
household secondary attack rates for pandemic influenza in a susceptible population where control measures had
yet to be implemented.
Methods: All Ontario local health units were invited to participate; seven health units volunteered. For all
laboratory-confirmed cases reported between April 24 and June 18, 2009, participating health units performed
contact tracing to detect secondary cases among household contacts. In total, 87 cases and 266 household
contacts were included in this study. Secondary cases were defined as any household member with new onset of
acute respiratory illness (fever or two or more respiratory symptoms) or influenza-like illness (fever plus one
additional respiratory symptom). Attack rates were estimated using both case definitions.
Results: Secondary attack rates were estimated at 10.3% (95% CI 6.8-14.7) for secondary cases with influenza-like
illness and 20.2% (95% CI 15.4-25.6) for secondary cases with acute respiratory illness. For both case definitions,
attack rates were significantly higher in children under 16 years than adults (25.4% and 42.4% compared to 7.6%
and 17.2%). The median time between symptom onset in the primary case and the secondary case was estimated
at 3.0 days.
Conclusions: Secondary attack rates for pandemic influenza A (H1N1) were comparable to seasonal influenza
estimates suggesting similarities in transmission. High secondary attack rates in children provide additional support
for increased susceptibility to infection.
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Upon detection of a novel strain of influenza A (H1N1)
virus in California and Mexico in March 2009 and sub-
sequent global distribution, the World Health Organiza-
tion declared an influenza pandemic on June 11, 2009
[1]. Understanding the transmission dynamics of this
novel virus was quickly deemed a priority in order to
develop effective mitigation strategies which would
minimize transmission until a vaccine was available.
Recommended control measures for seasonal influenza
epidemics include influenza vaccination, hand hygiene
and cough/sneeze etiquette, environmental cleaning and
self-isolation; however, pandemic plans also consider
travel restrictions, mass immunization, school closures
and restriction of mass public gatherings as potentially
effective mitigation strategies [2]. To determine which
control measures to recommend and how these mea-
sures should be targeted to populations at highest risk,
estimation of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (pH1N1) trans-
mission risk in various exposure settings and population
subgroups was necessary.
While factors influencing pH1N1 transmission were
largely unknown at the beginning of the pandemic, sea-
sonal influenza transmission studies had demonstrated
the importance of household settings and young chil-
dren in disease propagation. Transmission modes for
seasonal influenza include direct contact with infected
individuals, indirect contact with contaminated objects,
and inhalation of droplet particles released through
coughing and sneezing of infected individuals [3]. Given
the importance of close contact or shared environment
with infected individuals, households are important
exposure settings for influenza transmission. Simulation
models have estimated 30% to 40% of influenza trans-
mission occurs in households compared to 20% in
schools and the remainder in community settings [4].
Similarly, the role of childreni ni n f l u e n z at r a n s m i s s i o n
has been demonstrated by Loeb et al (2010) who found
that immunizing approximately 80% of children with tri-
valent influenza vaccine conferred 61% indirect protec-
tion for unimmunized residents of Hutterite
communities in Western Canada [5].
In anticipation of the pandemic, the provincial Minis-
try responsible for the pandemic response, the Ontario
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC),
issued an enhanced surveillance directive to local health
units requesting the investigation of severe and febrile
respiratory illness cases and entry of mandatory data
elements into the provincial information system used
for reporting case information on reportable communic-
able diseases to the MOHLTC. All laboratory-confirmed
cases of pH1N1 identified prior to June 20, 2009 were
investigated by health units and additionally, seven
health units volunteered to perform contact tracing in
household settings during the first nine weeks of pan-
demic virus circulation in Ontario to provide estimates
of transmissibility. The objectives of this study were to
estimate secondary attack rates of pH1N1 in a suscepti-
ble population where additional control measures, such
as mass immunization and antiviral prophylaxis, had yet
to be implemented and to identify population subgroups
at highest risk for illness.
Methods
Setting
Ontario’s public health system consists of 36 local health
units responsible for the delivery of local public health
programs, one central and 11 regional public health
laboratories.
Data Collection
The Ontario Agency for Health Protection and Promo-
tion (OAHPP) Laboratory (Toronto) performed the
majority of pH1N1 testing in Ontario; 84% of pH1N1
cases detected during the first wave (April 19, 2009 -
August 29, 2009) were tested at OAHPP and 69% in the
second wave (August 30, 2009 - January 31, 2010). All
respiratory specimens submitted to OAHPP laboratories
were tested. Specimens were initially tested using a
combination of endpoint reverse transcriptase (RT)
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for the influenza A
virus matrix gene and sequencing. Specimens submitted
after May 15, 2009 were tested using a more sensitive
r e a l - t i m eR T - P C Rf o rt h ep H 1 N 1( Ha n dNg e n e s )
developed at the Toronto laboratory. The Luminex
Respiratory Virus Panel multiplex assay and viral culture
were used to test approximately 6% of specimens [6].
While specimens were triaged so that patients at high
risk for complications from influenza were prioritized,
testing practices and triaging remained consistent with
one exception during this study period. Initially, patients
in emergency departments and ambulatory care settings
presenting with severe and febrile respiratory illness and
who reported travel to Mexico were recommended for
testing; travel criteria were removed on May 19, how-
ever, once sustained community spread was established.
Testing was later restricted to patients at high risk for
complications from influenza; although, this did not
occur until the end of the study period. Laboratory-con-
firmed cases of pH1N1 were reported to local health
units who performed detailed case investigations using a
standardized case report form. Case information was
entered into the integrated Public Health Information
System (iPHIS), the information system used by Ontar-
io’s 36 public health units for reporting case information
on reportable communicable diseases to the MOHLTC.
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cipate in this study. Staff at these health units performed
telephone interviews with index cases reported in iPHIS
between April 24 and June 18, 2009 to collect case
information and identify household contacts. This nine-
week period spanned the time to (and included) the
peak of the first wave in Ontario [7]. For two health
units with case volumes of >100, contact tracing was
restricted to cases reported up to May 24, 2009. Infor-
mation regarding self-reported exposure dates, symp-
toms, symptom onset, illness duration, specimen testing,
hospitalization status, and 2008/9 seasonal influenza
immunization status of contacts was collected using a
standard questionnaire. Additionally, laboratory testing
for symptomatic contacts was encouraged but did not
occur in most cases. Household contact information was
linked to case records through their iPHIS unique iden-
tifier. Using this approach, all records were successfully
linked.
Primary cases were defined as household members
with the earliest symptom onset date and laboratory-
confirmation of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus
infection by one or more of the following laboratory
tests: RT-PCR with genotyping of H1 and/or N1 novel
influenza virus, viral culture with strain typing or four-
fold rise in novel influenza A (H1N1) virus specific anti-
bodies by serology testing, or as the first person with
influenza-like illness (fever and ≥1 respiratory symptom
such as cough, sore throat, arthralgia, myalgia and
malaise) when another household member had a labora-
tory-confirmed pH1N1 infection. Household contacts
were defined as persons who had close contact (≥1h o u r
exposure within 2 metres) with a laboratory-confirmed
case in a household setting (shared, common accommo-
dation in terms of both sleeping and eating at least one
meal). All primary cases were eligible for inclusion in
this study if ≥1 household contact was identified. Sec-
ondary cases were defined either as household contacts
with acute respiratory illness (ARI, fever or ≥2r e s p i r a -
tory symptoms) or influenza-like illness (ILI), with
symptom onset >1 day to ≤14 days following symptom
onset of the primary case. Secondary household attack
rates were calculated as the proportion of household
contacts, excluding the primary case, meeting either sec-
ondary case definition.
Due to workload and other logistical concerns, pri-
mary case follow-up by public health units occurred at
different times. Where initial case contact occurred ≥7
days after symptom onset, the primary case was only
contacted once and all relevant information on the case
and household contacts was obtained. If the initial
investigation was conducted <7 days after symptom
onset, the primary case was re-contacted a second time
≥7 days after symptom onset, to further investigate
whether any new symptomatic contacts had developed.
Data on the investigation timeframe was collected in
order to detect potential ascertainment bias.
Analysis
Household contacts and the associated index case were
excluded from analysis if the contacts were lost to fol-
low-up or untraceable. If the serial interval, defined as
the time between symptom onset in the primary case
and the secondary case, was ≤1 day, the household con-
tact was defined as a co-primary case and excluded
from secondary attack rate calculations. Symptomatic
contacts with an onset date preceding the case onset
date by 2-5 days that met the ILI case definition or
tested positive for pH1N1 were reclassified as primary
cases.
The 95% confidence intervals (CI) for secondary
household attack rates were calculated from the bino-
mial distribution using exact methods [8]. Secondary
attack rates were cumulative and likely included tertiary
cases; however, secondary cases with a serial interval of
>14 days from the primary case were excluded in serial
interval and secondary attack rate calculations.
To test for differences between cases and contacts,
Pearson chi-squared and Wilcoxon rank sum tests were
used for categorical and continuous variables, respec-
tively. The statistical analysis was conducted using
STATA Version 10.1 (Statacorp, Texas, USA).
This study was conducted as a legally mandated public
health investigation under the authority of the Ontario
Health Protection and Promotion Act (R.S.O. 1990, c.
H.7).
Results
In total, 103 laboratory-confirmed index cases were
interviewed by public health staff, identifying 290 house-
hold contacts. Ten cases and their nine contacts (4.8%)
were excluded because household contacts were either
not identified or lost to follow-up. Additionally, 6 index
cases who did not meet the primary case definition were
excluded along with their 15 contacts (5.3%). Two con-
tacts had onset dates which preceded the primary case
by 3 days and were reclassified as primary cases, leaving
87 laboratory-confirmed cases of pH1N1 and 266 house-
hold contacts included in this analysis.
A mean of 3 household contacts were identified per
p r i m a r yc a s e( r a n g e1 - 7 ) .C a s e sw e r ef o l l o w e du p ,o n
average, 8 days after symptom onset (range 1 - 22 days).
For 79 cases (90.8%), investigations were completed ≥7
days after symptom onset. In total, 51 secondary cases
were identified in 34/87 (39.1%) households; 5 house-
holds each with 2 secondary cases, 3 households with 3
secondary cases and 2 households with 4 secondary
cases.
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Cases were significantly younger than their household
contacts (median difference = 16 years, p = 0.005); age
was missing for 49 (18.4%) household contacts (Table
1). Forty-seven cases (54.0%) and 119 contacts (44.7%)
were female (sex unknown for 14 contacts). Secondary
cases had a similar median age and gender distribution
as primary cases. Sixteen cases (18.4%), 73 contacts
(27.4%) and 15 (29.4%) secondary cases reported receiv-
ing the 2008/9 seasonal influenza vaccine; however,
missing vaccination status was more likely for contacts
(28.6%) and secondary cases (25.5%) compared to cases
(9.2%). The majority of cases (85.1%) reported experien-
cing ILI compared to 11.7% of household contacts and
51.0% of secondary cases. One case was hospitalized for
7d a y sa sar e s u l to fp H 1 N 1i n f e c t i o n .T h e r ew e r en o
known deaths.
Serial Interval
In total, 64 household contacts (including co-primary
and tertiary cases) met either the ARI or ILI secondary
case definition. Symptom onset dates were known for
56 contacts and their 39 primary cases. The median
serial interval was estimated at 3.0 days (range 0 - 20
days) (Figure 1); there was no difference in median serial
interval for symptomatic contacts with ILI compared to
those with ARI.
Secondary Attack Rates
Ten contacts reported a symptom onset date within 1
day of the primary case onset date and were reclassified
as co-primary cases, resulting in 97 primary/co-primary
cases and 256 contacts. Three symptomatic contacts
with a serial interval >14 days were excluded from this
analysis; secondary attack rates (SARs) were calculated
among the remaining 253 contacts (Table 2). SARs were
estimated at 10.3% (95% CI 6.8-14.7) for secondary
cases with ILI and 20.2% (95% CI 15.4-25.6) for
secondary cases with ARI. Rates were significantly
higher in children than adults (p = 0.001 and p < 0.001).
When stratified further by age, SARs were highest in
contacts aged 5-15 years (15/51 or 29.4% for ILI and
23/51 or 45.1% for ARI) and 25-39 years (5/29 or 17.2%
for ILI and 8/29 or 27.6% for ARI). Rates were lowest in
contacts aged 16-24 years (1/27 or 3.7% for ILI and 3/
27 or 11.1% for ARI) and 65 years and above (0/8 or
0.0% for ILI and 0/8 or 0% for ARI) (data not shown).
Of all contacts with unknown age (n = 49), only 1 met
the ARI case definition; the remainder did not report
experiencing respiratory symptoms. Excluding all house-
holds with co-primary cases (n = 8) did not change SAR
estimates.
Description of Laboratory Tested Contacts
Nasopharyngeal swabs were submitted and tested for 28
household contacts. Twelve tested positive for pH1N1
(42.9%), 1 result was indeterminate, and 2 tested positive
for seasonal influenza A (7.1%); the remaining 13 tests
Table 1 Characteristics of primary cases and their household contacts.
Characteristic Primary Cases n (%) Household Contacts n (%) Secondary Cases n (%)
Sex, Female 47 (54.0) 119 (44.7) 25 (49.0)
Age, median (range) 18 yrs (1-66) 34 yrs (1-81) 16 yrs (1-62)
Under 16 yrs 34 (39.1) 64 (24.1) 25 (49.0)
2008/9 Seasonal Influenza Vaccination 16 (18.4) 73 (27.4) 15 (29.4)
Reported ARI 85 (97.7) 64 (24.1) 51 (100.0)
Reported ILI 74 (85.1) 31 (11.7) 26 (51.0)
Reported Diarrhea or Vomiting* 21 (24.1) 5 (1.9) 5 (9.8)
Hospitalization 1 (1.1) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Specimen submitted and tested for pH1N1 86 (98.9) 28 (10.5) 17 (33.3)
N = 87 N = 266 N = 51
ARI, acute respiratory illness. ILI, influenza-like illness.
* Specific symptoms were not explicitly asked of contacts
Figure 1 Distribution of time from symptom onset of primary
case to symptom onset of secondary case. Note: Co-primary
cases are included. Date of onset was unknown for 8 secondary
cases. ARI, acute respiratory illness. ILI, influenza-like illness.
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for pH1N1, 11/12 (91.7%) experienced ILI, compared to
7/16 (43.8%) of the negative pH1N1 contacts (p =
0.009). Duration of illness was recorded for 5 positive
pH1N1 contacts and 6 negative or indeterminate
pH1N1 contacts. The median duration of illness was
longer among contacts testing positive for pH1N1 (8
days, range 2-11) compared to test negatives or indeter-
minates (3.5 days, range 1-9 days); although, this differ-
ence was not statistically significant (p = 0.196).
Specimen collection date was available for all 28 con-
tacts. For contacts on whom a specimen was collected
within 7 days of symptom onset, the median difference
in time between symptom onset and specimen collec-
tion was 1 day for positive pH1N1 contacts and 2.5 days
for negative/indeterminate pH1N1 contacts (p = 0.272).
Discussion
This study reports on household follow-up of 87 labora-
tory-confirmed pH1N1 cases in Ontario from late April
to early June. Overall household secondary attack rates
(SARs) were estimated between 10.3% and 20.2%, with
higher rates observed in children compared to adults.
These rates largely reflect transmission in the absence of
pharmaceutical intervention and therefore provide a
pure estimate which more closely characterizes trans-
mission dynamics without the influence of intervening
measures. Although not asked in this study, household
contacts were unlikely to have received antiviral prophy-
l a x i sa st h i sp u b l i ch e a l t hm e a s u r ew a sn o tr e c o m -
mended in Ontario [9] and the provincial stockpile of
antivirals was not released until October 22, 2009 [10].
In fact, despite the recommendation that antivirals be
prescribed for patients with ILI at high risk of complica-
tions, in an Ontario study examining risk factors for
pH1N1 infection, only 20% of laboratory-confirmed
cases of pH1N1 reported receiving antiviral treatment
during the first wave (personal communication, Laura
Rosella).
Results from this study corroborate two published
pH1N1 transmission studies in Japan and California
where SARs of 7.6% and 6% were estimated among
household contacts who did not receive antiviral pro-
phylaxis [11,12]. Similarly, an analysis of household
transmission of pH1N1 across the United States (U.S.)
found that 13% of household contacts of laboratory-con-
firmed cases reported ARI and 10% reported ILI; infor-
mation on antiviral prophylaxis of household contacts
was not available [13]. Higher household SARs for
pH1N1 have been reported in several studies [4,14-17].
Two of these reports, however, were based on follow up
of one index case in non-household settings (student
and tour groups) where interactions between individuals
may differ from traditional households, while another
two studies performed daily follow-up of households
and for a longer duration of time (8 and 14 days).
Household transmission studies for seasonal influenza
have reported SARs ranging from 5% to 40%, suggesting
similarities in transmission dynamics to pH1N1 [18-23].
The broad range of seasonal influenza SARs and influ-
enza subtypes, however, makes direct comparison
difficult.
Although we were unable to examine multiple risk
factors for infection, this study demonstrated higher
SARs for children; a finding consistent with previous
studies [24,25]. Age-related differences in infection may
be explained by increased susceptibility of children to
pH1N1 infection due to lack of pre-existing immunity
[26,27], increased contact with a larger number of extra-
household contacts than adults through school/daycare
[22], differing contact behaviour within the household
and poor adherence to personal protective measures
such as hand washing.
At an ecological level, hypotheses for additional risk
factors can be generated through comparison of SARs
across regions where differing public health interven-
tions were applied. In the U.S. and United Kingdom (U.
K.), policies on antiviral prophylaxis differed from
Ontario. While the broad use of antiviral prophylaxis
was not recommended, the policies stated that antiviral
prophylaxis could be considered for close contacts of
suspected or laboratory-confirmed cases at high risk of
Table 2 Household secondary attack rates by secondary case definition and age group.
Secondary Case Definition Age Group Contacts (N) Secondary Cases SAR (%) 95% CI P-value*
ARI Overall 253 51 20.2 15.4 - 25.6
Children <16 years 59 25 42.4 29.6 - 55.9 <0.001
Adults ≥16 years 145 25 17.2 11.5 - 24.3
ILI Overall 253 26 10.3 6.8 - 14.7
Children <16 years 59 15 25.4 15.0 - 38.4 0.001
Adults ≥16 years 145 11 7.6 3.8 - 13.2
Note: Age was missing for 49 contacts.
ARI, acute respiratory illness. ILI, influenza-like illness. CI, confidence interval.
*Pearson chi-squared test for the difference in SAR between children and adults.
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ers and emergency medical personnel and pregnant
women [28,29]. In the U.K., SARs of 18.9% for second-
ary contacts with ARI, 10.5% for contacts with ILI and
8.1% for contacts with laboratory confirmed pH1N1
were reported, with 50% of contacts reporting receipt of
antiviral prophylaxis four days after onset of illness in
the index case [30]. Additionally, two household trans-
mission studies in New York City and San Antonio
report comparable SARs (9% and 13%), although, uptake
of antiviral prophylaxis in household contacts was low
[25,24]. While all studies demonstrate significant reduc-
tions in transmission within households where antiviral
prophylaxis was administered, the overall impact of
these policies on transmission at a population level
remains unknown.
Comparable attack rates despite differing interventions
may be explained by the index case population included
in our study. Nishiura et al (2010) have demonstrated
the impact of initial conditions on estimating transmissi-
bility of an emerging pathogen; in Japan, the estimated
reproduction number for late May to early July was
much smaller than that estimated at the beginning of
the pandemic when transmission was confined mainly
to school settings [31]. In this study we did not have
data from health units with a large number of school
outbreaks. By not capturing a similar proportion of the
school-aged cases that played a major role in the early
spread of the pandemic virus, we may have underesti-
mated overall transmission rates in the population.
Bias introduced through case ascertainment may have
also underestimated SARs. Clinical case definitions can-
not capture all mild or asymptomatic cases; serological
testing is the most sensitive method for detecting inci-
dent cases. One published study on pH1N1 transmission
in Quebec City, Canada performed systematic serial
laboratory testing (including serological testing) to eval-
uate household contacts. Using this approach, Papen-
burg et al (2010) found a household SAR of 45% for
contacts with laboratory-confirmed pH1N1, which is
considerably higher than rates reported in this study
despite similar policies on antiviral prophylaxis and than
other published studies reliant on clinical syndromes to
define secondary cases [32]. Incomplete case follow-up
may have similarly underestimated SARs. While health
units were requested in this study to monitor house-
holds for a minimum of seven days, 9.2% of cases had a
shorter follow-up period. Despite this, if we missed 30%
of true secondary cases, the SAR for contacts with ILI
would have increased by 3% from 10.3% to 13.4%, which
still lies within ranges reported by other studies.
Cases with milder disease were captured in this study
through broader, clinical case definitions. While these
definitions are more sensitive, they are less specific and
can include cases without pH1N1 infection. During the
study period, entero- and rhinoviruses were co-circulat-
ing and could have been the causative organism for
some secondary cases; however, these viruses were not
identified in any laboratory tested contacts. Seasonal
influenza virus was also circulating in Ontario at this
time and detected in approximately 5% of all patients
tested at the OAHPP laboratories from late April until
e a r l yJ u n e ,a sw e l la s2o ft h e2 8c o n t a c t si nt h i ss t u d y
[33]. This finding illustrates the limitation of using clini-
cal syndromes, and not laboratory testing, to define
cases. Lastly, by the end of May 2009 in Ontario,
pH1N1 was endemic in the community; consequently,
secondary cases may have been misattributed to the
household primary case when acquisition occurred out-
side of the home, which would similarly inflate SARs.
Conclusions
Despite these limitations, the transmission characteris-
tics estimated by this study are in alignment with other
published reports and offer the added value of estimat-
ing transmission risk in a population where public
health interventions, such as antiviral prophylaxis and
school closures, were not yet implemented. Moderate
household secondary attack rates demonstrate the
importance of close contact among household members
in the transmission of pH1N1, while high secondary
attack rates in children provide additional support for
increased susceptibility to pH1N1 infection. We believe
that the findings of this study will be of interest to a
wide audience of public health physicians, clinicians,
modelers and policy makers who are involved in influ-
enza and pandemic planning and response. Given the
limitations of clinical definitions for case ascertainment,
other methods, such as serological testing in a prospec-
tive study, should be employed in future to determine
the effectiveness of intervening public health measures
in reducing transmission and to understand the risk of
transmission in various exposure settings.
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